The District Court granted summary judgment in KSR’s favor. After reviewing the pertinent history of pedal design, the scope of the Engelgau patent, and the relevant prior art, the court considered the validity of the contested claim. By direction of 35 U. S. C. §282, an issued patent is presumed valid. The District Court applied Graham’s framework to determine whether under summary-judgment standards KSR had overcome the
presumption and demonstrated that claim 4 was obvious in light of the prior art in existence when the claimed subject matter was invented. See §102(a).
The District Court determined, in light of the expert testimony and the parties’ stipulations, that the level of ordinary skill in pedal design was “‘an
undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering (or an equivalent amount of industry experience) [and] familiarity
with pedal control systems for vehicles.’” 298 F. Supp. 2d, at
590. The court then set forth the relevant prior art, including the patents and pedal designs described above.
Following Graham’s direction, the court compared the teachings of the prior art to the claims of Engelgau. It found “little difference.” 298 F. Supp. 2d, at 590. Asano taught everything contained in claim 4 except the use of
a sensor to detect the pedal’s position and transmit it to the computer controlling the throttle. That additional aspect was revealed in sources such as the ’068 patent and
the sensors used by Chevrolet.
Under the controlling cases from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, however, the District Court was not permitted to stop there. The court was required also to apply the TSM test. The District Court held KSR had satisfied the test. It reasoned (1) the state of the
industry would lead inevitably to combinations of electronic sensors and adjustable pedals, (2) Rixon provided the basis for these developments, and (3) Smith taught a solution to the wire chafing problems in Rixon, namely locating the
sensor on the fixed structure of the pedal. This could lead to the combination of Asano, or a pedal like it, with a
pedal position sensor.
The conclusion that the Engelgau design was obvious was supported, in the District Court’s view, by the PTO’s rejection of the broader version of claim 4. Had
Engelgau included Asano in his patent application, it reasoned, the PTO would have found claim 4 to be an obvious
combination of Asano and Smith, as it had found the broader version an obvious combination of Redding and Smith.
As a final matter, the District Court held that the secondary factor of Teleflex’s commercial success with pedals based on Engelgau’s design did not alter its conclusion. The District Court granted summary judgment for KSR.
With principal reliance on the TSM test, the Court of Appeals reversed. It ruled the District Court had not been strict enough in applying the test, having failed to
make “‘finding[s] as to the specific understanding or principle
within the knowledge of a skilled artisan that would have motivated one with no knowledge of [the] invention’ . . .
to attach an electronic control to the support bracket of the Asano assembly.” 119 Fed. Appx., at 288 (brackets in original) (quoting In re Kotzab, 217 F. 3d 1365, 1371 (CA Fed. 2000)). The Court of Appeals held that the District Court was incorrect that the nature of the problem to be solved satisfied this requirement because unless the “priorart references address[ed] the precise problem that the patentee was trying to solve,” the problem would
not motivate an inventor to look at those references. 119 Fed. Appx., at 288.
Here, the Court of Appeals found, the Asano pedal was designed to solve the “‘constant ratio problem’”—that is, to ensure that the force required to depress the pedal is the same no matter how the pedal is adjusted—whereas Engelgau sought to provide a simpler, smaller,
cheaper adjustable electronic pedal. Ibid. As for Rixon, the court explained, that pedal suffered from the problem of wire chafing but was not designed to solve it. In the court’s view Rixon did not teach anything helpful to Engelgau’s purpose. Smith, in turn, did not relate to adjustable
pedals and did not “necessarily go to the issue of motivation to attach the electronic control on the support bracket of the pedal assembly.” Ibid. When the patents were
interpreted in this way, the Court of Appeals held, they would not have led a person of ordinary skill to put a sensor on the sort of pedal described in Asano.
That it might have been obvious to try the combination of Asano and a sensor was likewise irrelevant, in the court’s view, because “‘“[o]bvious to try” has long been held not to constitute obviousness.’” Id., at 289 (quoting In re Deuel, 51 F. 3d 1552, 1559 (CA Fed. 1995)).
The Court of Appeals also faulted the District Court’s consideration of the PTO’s rejection of the broader version of claim 4. The District Court’s role, the Court of Appeals explained, was not to speculate regarding what the PTO might have done had the Engelgau patent mentioned Asano. Rather, the court held, the District Court was obliged first to presume that the issued patent was
valid and then to render its own independent judgment of obviousness based on a review of the prior art. The fact that the PTO had rejected the broader version of claim 4,
the Court of Appeals said, had no place in that analysis.
The Court of Appeals further held that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. Teleflex had proffered statements from one expert that claim 4 “‘was a simple, elegant, and novel combination of features,’” 119 Fed. Appx., at 290, compared to Rixon, and from another expert that claim 4 was nonobvious because, unlike
in Rixon, the sensor was mounted on the support bracket rather than the pedal itself. This evidence, the court concluded, sufficed to require a trial.
We begin by rejecting the rigid approach of the Court of Appeals. Throughout this Court’s engagement with the question of obviousness, our cases have set forth an
expansive and flexible approach inconsistent with the way the Court of Appeals applied its TSM test here. To be sure, Graham recognized the need for “uniformity
and definiteness.” 383 U. S., at 18. Yet the principles laid down in Graham reaffirmed the “functional approach” of Hotchkiss, 11 How. 248. See 383 U. S., at 12. To this end, Graham set forth a broad inquiry and invited courts, where appropriate, to look at any secondary
considerations that would prove instructive. Id., at 17.
Neither the enactment of §103 nor the analysis in Graham disturbed this Court’s earlier instructions
concerning the need for caution in granting a patent based on the
combination of elements found in the prior art. For over a half century, the Court has held that a “patent for a
combination which only unites old elements with no change int heir respective functions . . . obviously withdraws what
is already known into the field of its monopoly and diminishes the resources available to skillful men.” Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U. S. 147, 152 (1950). This is a principal reason for declining to allow patents for what is obvious. The
combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield
predictable results. Three cases decided after Graham illustrate the application of this doctrine.
In United States v. Adams, 383 U. S. 39, 40 (1966), a companion case to Graham, the Court considered the obviousness of a “wet battery” that varied from prior designs in two ways: It contained water, rather than the acids conventionally employed in storage batteries; and
its electrodes were magnesium and cuprous chloride, rather than zinc and silver chloride. The Court recognized that when a patent claims a structure already known in the prior art that is altered by the mere substitution of
one element for another known in the field, the combination must do more than yield a predictable result. 383 U. S., at 50–51. It nevertheless rejected the Government’s
claim that Adams’s battery was obvious. The Court relied upon the corollary principle that when the prior art
teaches away from combining certain known elements, discovery of a successful means of combining them is more likely
to be nonobvious. Id., at 51–52. When Adams designed his battery, the prior art warned that risks were involved in using the types of electrodes he employed. The fact that the elements worked together in an unexpected and
fruitful manner supported the conclusion that Adams’s design was not obvious to those skilled in the art.
In Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U. S. 57 (1969), the Court elaborated on this approach.
The subject matter of the patent before the Court was a device combining two pre-existing elements: a radiant-heat burner and a paving machine. The device, the Court concluded, did not create some new synergy: The radiant-heat burner functioned just as a burner was expected
to function; and the paving machine did the same. The two in combination did no more than they would in
separate, sequential operation. Id., at 60–62. In those circum-stances, “while the combination of old elements performed a useful function, it added nothing to the nature and quality of the radiant-heat burner already patented,”
and the patent failed under §103. Id., at 62 (footnote omitted).
Finally, in Sakraida v. AG Pro, Inc., 425 U. S. 273 (1976), the Court derived from the precedents the
conclusion that when a patent “simply arranges old elements with each performing the same function it had been known to perform” and yields no more than one would expect from such an arrangement, the combination is obvious. Id., at 282.
The principles underlying these cases are instructive when the question is whether a patent claiming the
combination of elements of prior art is obvious. When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either
in the same field or a different one. If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, §103 likely bars its patentability. For the same reason, if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person
of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the
technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond hisor her skill. Sakraida and Anderson’s-Black Rock are illustrative—a court must ask whether the improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions.
Following these principles may be more difficult in other cases than it is here because the claimed subject matter may involve more than the simple substitution of one known element for another or the mere application of a known technique to a piece of prior art ready for the
improvement. Often, it will be necessary for a court to look to interrelated teachings of multiple patents; the effects
of demands known to the design community or present in the
marketplace; and the background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the art, all in order to determine whether there was an apparent reason to
combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue. To facilitate review, this analysis
should be made explicit. See In re Kahn, 441 F. 3d 977, 988 (CA Fed. 2006)
(“[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obvious-ness”). As our precedents make clear, however, the
analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a
court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.
When it first established the requirement of demonstrating a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to
combine known elements in order to show that the combination is obvious, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals cap-tured a helpful insight. See Application of
Bergel, 292F. 2d 955, 956–957 (1961). As is clear from cases such as Adams, a patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art.
Although common sense directs one to look with care at a patent application that claims as innovation the
combination of two known devices according to their established functions, it can be important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention does. This is so because inventions in most, if not all, instances rely upon building blocks
long since uncovered, and claimed discoveries almost of necessity will be combinations of what, in some sense, is already known.
Helpful insights, however, need not become rigid and mandatory formulas; and when it is so applied, the
TSM test is incompatible with our precedents. The obviousness analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic conception
of the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by overemphasis on the importance of published articles and the explicit content of issued patents. The diversity of inventive pursuits and of modern technology
counsels against limiting the analysis in this way. In many fields it may be that there is little discussion of obvious
techniques or combinations, and it often may be the case that market
demand, rather than scientific literature, will drive design trends. Granting patent protection to advances
that would occur in the ordinary course without real innovation retards progress and may, in the case of patents
combining previously known elements, deprive prior inventions of their value or utility.
In the years since the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals set forth the essence of the TSM test, the Court
of Appeals no doubt has applied the test in accord with these principles in many cases. There is no necessary
inconsistency between the idea underlying the TSM test and the Graham analysis. But when a court transforms the
general principle into a rigid rule that limits the obviousness inquiry, as the Court of Appeals did here, it errs.
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